

# Cost Containment Mechanisms for RGGI

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# Why RGGI Needs Flexibility

Forecasts are always wrong...

## Prices could be too low

- As a result of technological innovation
- Being wrong on the low side (over-allocation) could undermine investments and the incentive to innovate
- Reserve price in auction will guard against this outcome (and is generally good auction design)

## Prices could be too high

- Possibly as a result of technological limits
- Due to economic volatility
- Being wrong on the high side could undermine economic growth or commit economy to higher costs than anticipated

# Flexibility Mechanisms

## Ways to introduce costs management in cap and trade systems

### Banking

### Offsets

- Timing is an issue

### Strategic Expenditures

- Energy efficiency

### Price Collars

- Reserve price (price floor)
- Allowance reserves (price ceilings)

# Hard versus Soft Price Collars

Are there limits on allowances offered/purchased?

## Soft Collar

- Make allowances available from a reserve when price reaches a trigger
- Introduce a fixed quantity of allowances from the allowance reserve into program

## Hard Collar

- Introduce an unlimited quantity of allowances at price trigger.

A **soft collar** provides some relief but if price expectations prove to be wildly wrong, reserve will be exhausted and prices will move beyond the collar.

A **hard collar** provides unlimited additional allowances, but raises specter that emissions could increase beyond environmental target

# Important Feature of Soft Collars

## Biggest bang for the buck.

- First allowances made available when price hits trigger provide greatest relief in terms of program costs.
- Diminishing returns to adding more allowances to reserve.
- In an uncertain, dynamic context, less likely that additional allowances will be used.
- A limited allowance reserve provides most of cost savings while avoiding possibility of busting the cap.

# Populating the RGGI Allowance Reserve

Three options are available:

## 1. Unsold allowances from prior auctions

## 2. Assign allowances identified as part of adjustments to cap

- Options 1 and 2 bring additional allowances into program if reserve is tapped

## 3. Bring allowances forward from future time periods.

- This is the approach to be used in California program
  - 4% of allowances over 2013-2020 in reserve with no vintage.
- System borrowing which is distinct from firm-level borrowing

# How to introduce allowances

## Going from the reserve to the market

- Having limited sales of allowances from the reserve at particular time could lead to rationing.
- Could solve this by
  - Having a continuously open window with first come first served.
  - Having an auction of reserve allowances with a reserve price equal to the high side of the price collar.

# Designing the Collar

**This is an economic and political decision**

**Expected prices will depend on whether RGGI cap is tightened or not.**

- Implications for ceilings and floors

**Expected prices will depend on design of the collar.**

- Bidding, trading and banking behavior will be influenced by collar design

**Collar could replace current offset trigger mechanism.**

**Uncertain collars may diminish benefits of added certainty.**

**Simplicity is an important principle of collar design.**

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Thank you.