See the State Proceeds and Allowances table for a summary of Auction [[ auction_number ]] proceeds by state.
RGGI Auction [[ auction_number ]] was held on [[ auction_date ]] and monitored by Potomac Economics, an independent monitor of electricity markets retained to evaluate the RGGI CO2 allowance market. Potomac observed the auction and found no material evidence of collusion or manipulation by bidders.
Below are key data and information on the results of the auction. Detailed analysis is available in the Market Monitor Report for Auction [[ auction_number ]].
1. Auction Statistics
- Offering: [[ quantity_offered ]]
- Quantity Sold: [[ quantity_sold ]]
- Clearing Price: $[[ clearing_price ]]
- Number of Bidders: [[ actual_bidders ]]
- Final Ratio of Bids to Supply: [[ ratio ]].00
- Percent Won by Compliance Entities: [[ percent_won_by_compliance ]]%
2. Auction Participation
A total of [[ potential_bidders ]] potential bidders submitted an Intent to Bid in the auction. For a list of potential bidders by name, see the Market Monitor Report.
The market monitor's report summarizes auction participation for compliance entities.
Compliance Entities are firms with a compliance obligation and their affiliates.
In Auction [[ auction_number ]], Compliance Entities purchased [[ percent_won_by_compliance ]]% of the allowances sold.
In the first [[ auction_number ]] RGGI auctions, compliance entities and their affiliates purchased [[ cumulative_won_by_complian ]]% of the allowances sold.
82% of allowances in circulation will be held by Compliance Entities following the settlement of allowances sold in Auction [[ auction_number ]].
3. Dispersion of Bids
In the offering of allowances for the current control period, bids were submitted by 33 Compliance Entities and 9 other entities.
7 Compliance Entities and 6 other entities submitted bids for a large quantity of allowances (i.e., at least 2 million tons).
Overall, Compliance Entities accounted for 54% of the quantity of allowances for which bids were submitted. The quantity of allowances for which bids were submitted was [[ ratio ]] times the initial offering of [[ quantity_offered ]] allowances.